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finishes a trip, he reports in the next morning for work
(Tr. G), receiving assigmnents from the di::;patclter (Tr.
7).
On the night prior to the morning of the accident
plaintiff had just completed a trip to Vernal, Utah (Tr.
7). He signed in at the company yard at about midnight,
after he completed the trip (Tr. 7). He then drove home,
slept and left his house in the morning, intending to
return to the yard (Tr. 7). He was not able to start
his truck and telephoned the dispatch office (Tr. 3).
The dispatcher suggested that he check the truck for
ignition and gas and see what the problem was (Tr. 3).
He added that if plaintiff were not able to correct the
problem, he would send help (Tr. 3). ln an effort to
start the truck, the plaintiff poured gasoline into the
carburetor while his wife was operating the starter.
A fire resulted and he was injured (Tr. 4).

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Testimony in the captioned matter was held before
a hearing officer on November 29, 1965. A ruling was
handed down· by the Commission on January 25, 1966,
adverse to the plaintiff. The Commission determined
that the plaintiff did sustain an injury by accident, but
that it was not in the course of his employment. The
plaintiff subsequently petitioned for reh<>aring and rf'versal of the Couunis::;ion'::; ord<:·r denying his daim.
rrhe petition was denied. rl1 his appeal followl'd.
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RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT
Defendants seek an affinnance of the order of the
lndm;trial Commission.

ARGUMENT
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS
SUPPORTED BY THE LAW AND THE
RECORD.
1. The Law Defining "Course of Employment"
"Course of employment" is a concept which depend:::;
upon the peculiar circumstances of each case. The question may not be resolved by reference to any fixed
formula. ( 58 Amjur. \Vorkmen 's Compensation, ~210).
ln very general terms, when an accident takes place
within the pe1'iod of the employment at a place where
llw employee reasonably may be in the performance
of his duties and while he iR fulfilling those duties or
mgaged in doing something incidental thereto, or as
sometimes stated, where he is engaged in the furtherance
of his employer's busines::;, he is considered to be in the
course of his employment. (Id. ~212). The hazards enc-ountered by employees while going to or returning
fro111 their regnlar place of employment before reaching
or after reaching the employer'::; premises, are not ordinarily incident to the employment, and for this reason
injnri<.'s resulting from such hazards are in most instances
1wl<1 not to bP compensabk, as arising out of and in the
('Olll"S\~ of Pmploynwnt. ( s('(:' Roberts v. l 11dustrial Com111ission of l'tah, 7 tTt. 10, -17 P.2d 1052, and Starr Piano
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Co. v. Industrial Accident Commi...,sion, 181 Cal. 433, 184
P. 860) (58 Amjur. §217).
It is true that this general rule is subject in most
jurisdictions to some exceptions which depend upon the
nature, circumstances and conditions of the particular
employment and the course of the injury. TlH' principal
exceptions are where the employer provides the transportation or remunerates the employee for tlw time or
expense involved or where the employee performs or
expects to perform such substantial task or dnty in connection with his employment at home or enroute. (See
J.lf organ v. Industrial Commission of Utah, GG P.2d 144,
92 U. 129) (58 Amjur. §217). A further exception to the
general rule of noncompensability has been made in
some instances where the employee doPs not work regular
hours or is subject to call, but not all authorities recognize such an exception. ( 58 Amjur. §217). rrhe presence
or absence of control by the employer over the acts
and movements of the employee while traveling to or
from work, while a factor to be considered in determining whether an injury received while so traveling is
compensable, as arising out of and in the course of
employment, i·s not decisive. (Id. at §217).
In support of his bri<:>f ,the plaintiff has cited the
case of Knou:les v. North Dakota lVorknu'11's Compensation Bitreau, 1925, 52 N.D. 563, 203 N.\V. 895. Tlw
court, in that cas(~, turned its deeision on th<> f'act that
the applicant in that matter had im;t nwtiom; frn111 a
::;uperior to deliver the crnployer\; trnek at th<· shops
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on the morning he was injured, because it was needed
or intended for certain specific purposes. One of the
officers or employees of the company testified that applicant was on duty when he was injured. The court went
on to say that applicant had been engaged on his own
busjness (he had borrowed the vehicle from his em11loyer) and was not within the course of his employment
and trjed to deliver the company vehicle back to the
warehouse but found it locked. If, in this attempt, he
liau been injured, he wonld not have been within the
course of his employment. Ho\1iever, upon finding the
\Varehouse locked, he sought instructions from his superiors, who told him to take the truck to his home and in
the morning to drive it, not to the warehouse where it
had been delivered to him, but to the shops where some
\rnrk was to be done with it that very morning and by
the applicant himself. The court said:

"It is not a case where an employee is injured
on the way to or from work; he was actually
at work, obedient to the orders of the employer
to ddiver the truck at the place where work was
to be done with it."
ln t~ffoct, applicant was a servant who owed the implicit
obedience incident to that statns to begin his services
under the labor contract by fetching the truck to the
shops, \Vhere he and it would be put into active service.
1'he court vvas making a distinction from a bailee-bailor
rdationship.
rrhe Bornk ease, also eitt>d hy the plaintiff in sup-

1iort of his position, may be distinguished under the rules
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set down in a treatise cited by plaintiff, that is, Horowit~
Current Trends in \Vorlanen's Compensation. On page
677 of that work, it is stated that the general rule that
a worker is not in the course of his employment until he
crosses the employment threshhold, is subject to some
exceptions. For instance, off-premise injuries to or from
work in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable
if the employee is on his way to or from work in a
vehicle owned or supplied by the employer and where
the employer has promised, or hy custom pays for transportation to and from work. An exception has also been
made in "on call" situations which involYe living on the
premises, as with domestic seITants, nurses, etc., or
where a garage mechanic brings his own car to work for
tow and repair service, etc. The Borak case is distinguishable from the instant situation in this particular.
Additionally, the Utah court has not seen fit to extend
the coverage of Worlanen's Compensation to this extent.
Bailey v. Utah State Indiistrial Commission, 398 P.2d
545, 16 Ut. 2d 208 (1965) is a case cited by plaintiff.
'l'hat case is distinguishable from the instant case, in
that (and Judge Callister called it a "close" case) the
applicant was injured on his ·way to work and his car was
constantly used for emergency calls at all hours. Further, in support of its decision, tlH~ court, in Bailey,
cited certain Utah cases which it is productive to exam-

ine.
Fidelity & Casualty ColiljJ(lil,IJ et al. c. f ll(l11strial
Commission et al., 8 P.2d 617, 79 Ut. u-m, \\·as a cast· in
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\\'hirh a rnotlwr sought comvensation for the d0ath of
ltcr son. He was employed by a drug conqmny and lus
c'mploymtc,11t required him to use a bicycle for the deliver)· of Kodak films. He was additionally rel1uired
to pick up certain films on his way to work and deliver
tlwm to the plant of his employer. He was supposed
to nrrive at work at 8 :00 a.rn. on the morning of the
injury ·which resulted in his death. He had left home but
11ad not yet arriYed at the place where he was to pick up
the films wben he \vas hurt. The court denied compensation on the ground that he was outside the course of his
employment. They stated the general rule that an injury
sustained by an employee while going to or returning
from his place of work is not an injury arising out of
and in the course of his employment and hence, an injury
thns snstaim d is not compensable under ·workmen's
C'om1Jensation. It also stated that the Utah court is
committed to such a doctrine. The court said that he
was not under the control of his employer and the time
when he was to enter upon his employment had not yet
1

arrived.
Covey Ballard Motor Company u. Industrial
Com mission, G4 Ut. 1, 227 P. 10:28 is a ease in which a
commission salesman who had a duty to be at all times
on the lookout for prospective purchasers and who was
paid on a commission, was injured at 9 :45 p.rn., while
driving !tis rar from the motor company to his home.
Tl1<.• court held that tht> injury did not occur in the course
oJ' his ('mployment. It said the applicant \Vas riding in
J1i~ own C'ar and selected his own ronte and that he had

no prospective purchaser in viPw and none in mind, bnt
was simply going home after his day's wmk. The court
said that if it had been shown that he was doing something which a salesman usually does to secure a purchaser for the wares that he is selling, there might then
be some basis upon which the award conld be sustained.
In effect, the court stated that he was not employed,
that is, performing any function for his employer as part
of his job at that specific time.
In the .Wilson v. Industrial Cuo11ni::;sio11 case, 110
Ut. 46, 207 P.2d 1116, a elairn was made by de1wndents
of a deceased party for an Industrial Comrnission award.
The decedent was a foreman and had been instructed by
his employer to go out to :Magna and bring an automobile
back to Salt Lake City but to complete repairs on it in
Magna before bringing it back. rrhc mt>thod of returning
the automobile was left entirely up to the decedent. On
his way out to l\fagna, decedent sustained fatal injuries
while riding as a passenger in the automobile of another
party hired by decedent's employer to assi8t decedent.
Decedent had no regular hours, though he was ordinarily
expected to corrunence work at 8 :00 A.l\l. rrhe accident
happened at about 8 :15 A.M. The aecident did not hap1wn
within the course of decedent's employrnl•nt. The eonrt
stated the general rule, ·with which the claimant agreed,
but the claimant pressed for application of the exception
that an injury sustained by an employev, either on his
employer's or his own time, arises out of his vmployment
if the employee is injnred while upon a mission for tlH'
employer.
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The court cited Cha11dler v. Industrial Cornrnission,
(jQ Ut. :387, 208 P. 499, for the proposition that an award
sl10nld be sustained and a claim granted 'vhere the accidc~nt occurred during a trip which was a distinct part
of a definite duty - more than merely going to work,
all(l actually an errand for his employer at the time of
the accident, and also cited the Kahn Brus. 1_;. 111dustrial
Commis.<sion case, 75 Ut. 145, 283 P. 1054, for the same
vropm:;ition ..Judge Latimer, then, speaking for the court
in the ·Wilson case, said that unless the contract of employment contemplated that the employer-employee relationship would commence when deceased left his home,
it would be necessary for the status to be created by
some special mission enroute to work before deceased
would be within the protection of the vVorkmen's Compensation Act. It held that this was not the case.
In conclusion, the essence of the Utah decisions is
that in order for the exception to the general rule to
apply, the employee must be engaged in some activity
other than simply going to or from work, and that
activity must be on behalf of his employer.
2. The Comrnission's Order is Snpported by the

Recorded Evidence.
The evidence as recorded in the transcript of proceedings clearly supports a finding that the plaintiff
was not in the course of his employment at the time
111· was injured. On the night prior to his accident, the
plaintiff had n:·turned from a trip to Yernal, Utah,
aniving· in Salt Lake City around 11 :00 or 12 :00 o'clock
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at night (Tr. 7). He signed in at the yard on his
arrival, terminating that trip, and then, as was his habit,
drove his tractor directly to his home in Bountiful, a
town located some 12 or 13 miles north of Salt Lab
City (Tr. 6, 7). On the day of the accideut, the plaintiff
left his home shortly before 9 :00 a.m. CI1r. 3, 7, 8), and
attempted to start his truck (Tr. 3). In his own vwrds,
"he was ready to go to 1vork'' (Tr. 3). He called the
company dispatcher and told him he could not start
the truck. The dispatcher logically suggested that he
check it out for ignition and gas. He further suggested
that if the plaintiff could not start the truck then, the
employer would send help to him (Tr. 3). In an effort
to start the truck, plaintiff poured gasoline in the carb~
uretor, while his wife was operating the starter. Not
surprisingly, a fire started. He was bunwd and this
claim resulted (Tr. 3-4). Plaintiff's employment arrangement as a trucker for Commercial Carriers, Inc. involved
his being paid a salary based on tlw loaded trip mile
(Tr. 5, 12). For pay purposes, mileage begins when he
leaves the yard with a load. The ICC regulations require
that he log all his miles, (Tr. 9) but clearly for inspec•
ti on and safety reasons (Tr. 12). Even if we were to
accept plaintiff's construction of the ICC regulations,
that the ICC regulation set the course of employment
limits, (Tr. 8) his work could not in logic conceivably
begin under that theory until and unless the truck wern
moving and accumulating mileage•. He is not paid for
the miles from his home to tlw yard. Plaintiff owns his
own tractor, which he leases to Cornuwrcial Carriers,
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Inc. (Tr. 6). The company owns the trailer (Tr. 6).
When plaintiff is in town, he reports in for work in the
morning err. 6-8). \¥hen completing a trip he signs
in at the yard, establishing his availability for a new
trip and his priority relative thereto (Tr. 7). His work
hegins when his dispatcher assigns a load to him, though
lie estimated, due to his seniority, that he would be given
a load that morning. This \Vas simply a calculation based
011 past experience, and he certainly could have been in
error. More importantly, it is obvious that this calculation could only have been confirmed by the dispatcher
the next day, and until it was, he did not have a load to
carry and was not assnred of pay for that day. The
dispatching begins at 9 :00 a.m. Essentially, then, at the
time he was injured, plaintiff was just short of even
b(~ing on his way to work. Whether or not plaintiff himself was a licensed common carrier, a point raised by
Plaintiff, is not material in the light of the law as
applied to the record.
CONCLUSION
There is no justification nnder Utah Workmen's
Compensation Law for rehearing this matter or for a
n~versal or modifying the Commission's determination
tlierein. Viewed most favorably to plaintiff's position,
within the scope of the case law, the course of his employmc-mt began when he left the terminal with a load
il<'stined for Yernal and rnded when he sigrn~d in at the
~alt Lak<• City tenuinal. Since he was not on any particnlar assignment or mission in behalf of his employer
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a.t the time of injury, the act of attempting to start his
tractor did not place him in an area exceptional to the
general rule of law defining the course of employment.
The Commission has not acted arbitrarily, capriciously
or contrary to law, and its determination should be sustained and the petition for rehearing denied.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
By Norman S. Johnson
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
1205 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

